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ACADEMIA Letters
Rosenkranz’s Report on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit:
A Short Analysis
Daniel Shannon

Karl Rosenkranz was the editor-in-chief of Hegel’s Collected Works, vols. 1-12(1832-44).
He wrote Hegel’s Life (1844) as a supplement to these Works.1 He has an advantage over
most other commentators on Hegel. Not only did he speak with Hegel about his philosophy,
but he also had access to his manuscripts, letters, and the recollections of students, family
members, and acquaintances. Rosenkranz was himself an adept and proliﬁc philosopher. He
is remembered primarily today for his work on Hegel, but in his own right he is still considered
for his Encyclopedia of Theological Sciences (1831), Pedagogy as System (1848)–which was
translated into English under the title Philosophy of Education (1886)—Aesthetics of the Ugly
(1853) and the Science of the Logical Idea (1858).2 By virtue of his close ties to Hegel and
his own philosophical abilities he appears able to understand and express the complexity and
subtly of Hegel’s philosophical thought.
His report, while informative and carrying weight, should be read, however, with caution when it comes to Hegel’s formative years. He is describing events and compositions that
occurred forty years before his report was written, and about a time where the principal proponents of the system of idealism, namely, Hegel and Schelling, later in life did not agree on
what had transpired or been intended.3 Rosenkranz, at times, seems loose with his descrip1

Karl Rosenkranz, “Die phänomeneologische Krisis des Systems bis 1807” in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels
Leben (1844, rpt; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977), 201-15. Hereafter this work will be
abbreviated as Hegels Leben followed by page number. All translations from the German texts are my own.
2
Karl Rosenkranz, Philosophy of Education, trans. by Anna C. Bracket (2nd ed., NY: D. Appleton & Co.,
1886). A complete list of Rosenkranz’s publications can be found online: Joachim Butzlaﬀ, “Rosenkranz, Karl,”
Neue Deutsche Biographie (22) 2005, 70-1, webpage: accessed, 21 December 2020, Deutsche Biographie Rosenkranz, Karl (deutsche-biographie.de).
3
The best-known instances concern who wrote the “Oldest System Program” (c. 1798) and who was the prinAcademia Letters, March 2021
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tions and was not entirely accurate in his dating. We see, even on the ﬁrst page of his report,
his tendency to speak of the lectures, the articles of the Critical Journal (1801-3), the various
system projections from 1802-6 as if they were all occurring more or less at the same level
of importance.4 There are in fact three distinct Jena System Projections, which remain only
as draft documents for his lectures at Jena. Only these survive; none of the actual lectures,
outside of excerpts provided by Rosenkranz, remain. While the articles clearly reﬂect Hegel’s
joint project with Schelling, the lectures, especially those on the history of philosophyand
speculative philosophy (philosophical logic), which Rosenkranz relies upon and quotes, were
composed after Schelling left Jena in 1803. They show a growing distance between Hegel and
his former colleague. Rosenkranz’s perspective is, however, from the hindsight of the Berlin
period (1818-31), and he tends to ignore the details of Hegel’s arguments in order to focus
instead on what he believes to be the most important intuitions conveyed by the text.
Despite some problems in his interpretation there are, nonetheless, points that he makes
which we should consider authoritative. (1) The Phenomenology arises from a crisis that
occurred in the composition of second Jena System Projection, the Logic, Metaphysics, and
Natural Philosophy of 1804-5, on the issue of what constitutes the concept of consciousness
based upon the dialectic of experience.5 (2) The Phenomenology is rooted in the history of
philosophy, especially the history of philosophy focused on transcendental idealism, as articulated ﬁrst by Fichte and then by Schelling; in this regard the book shows how Hegel overcame
cipal author of the Critical Journal article, “Introduction. On the Essence of Philosophical Critique in General,”
but in more general terms Schelling contended that Hegel developed his system out of Schelling’s own. Hegel
held, in contrast, that the mature system begins with the Phenomenology, was his own creation, and had little to
do with Schelling’s projects. Although there is some truth in both accounts, Rosenkranz obviously takes Hegel’s
side in this dispute, and much of his discussion of the Jena period concerns Hegel’s break with Schelling, which
Rosenkranz dates from 1804, during the composition of Jena System II. This is shortly after Schelling had left
Jena in 1803 for Swabia and, ultimately, forWürzburg but before Hegel began to write the draft Phenomenology
circa the spring of 1805.
4
Otto Pöggeler points that Rosenkranz misdates some of the earlier manuscript materials, and in some instances, he does not have a proper sense of the early chronology. He remarks that “Rosenkranz did not yet see
clearly the development of young Hegel’s thought,” Hegels Leben, 568.
5
Rosenkranz says, “Only one additional action was necessary for Hegel to achieve his complete independence
[from Schelling]. This was the Phenomenology of Spirit. This entirely new philosophy arises from the concept
of self-consciousness. Schelling had… directed subjective idealism to objectivity, where the unity of subject and
object was entirely presupposed by him. Hegel sublimated the concept of self-consciousness not simply within
the absolute…but within the concept of spirit as a simple moment. Moreover, he sublimated the concept of
substantiality that had been continually refashioned under various forms as the limit of self-consciousness. He
developed, instead, the concept of experience that constitutes self-consciousness, initially, in his [Jena System II]
Introduction to the Logic and Metaphysics. From this project of 1804 the construction of the Phenomenology
came to exist, and in it he put the useful results of his studies from that period,” Hegels Leben, 202, emphasis is
in the original.
Academia Letters, March 2021
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these other philosophers’ respective expositions of the idealistic system.6 (3) There are two
distinct sides to spirit: ﬁnite spirit, or consciousness, which is the empirically conditioned
mind, the concept of which is composed of intellect and will, and inﬁnite spirit, or the absolute, which transcends all empirical limitations. Rosenkranz tells us that absolute spirit
emerges when knowledge, as the unity between singular and universal self-consciousness,
becomes absolute being.7 Knower and known are identical to each other. (4) There are two
movements occurring and playing themselves out in the book: one that proceeds empirically
and has a linear ascent. It is limited and conditioned by culture and ﬁnite experience. The
other follows the path of inﬁnite spirit and proceeds circularly to achieve a completed ideality
in the system of science. This second path constitutes the transcendence of spirit as absolute
knowledge. The ﬁrst path constitutes the appearance of observing knowledge in ﬁnite spirit
as a series of stages. Both paths exhibit the development of self-consciousness.8 The second
path, once free of apparent knowledge, becomes the subject matter of the Science of Logic
of 1812-16. It presents the procession of pure ontological categories, which begins from the
identity of absolute knowledge with being in the Phenomenology. This way passes beyond
the ﬁnite shapes of consciousness and is the true essence (Wesen) of absolute spirit. Absolute
spirit, since it arises from the stages of ﬁnite spirit, still belongs to human experience because
it recollects the historical path of consciousness. Its genesis as transcendent being reﬂects its
own historical evolution and transﬁguration. The barrier (Schranke) of ﬁnitude is transcended
in the system because absolute knowledge, or being, which is resurrected from its phenomenological development, has for its epistemic objects the pure entia rationis of philosophical logic.
Finally, (6) Rosenkranz contends, against Hegel’s detractors, that the Phenomenology is not
the prolegomenon to the Logic but is the initial starting point of the system itself. It focuses on
the formation of self-consciousness in systematic philosophy. The other parts of the system
must always presuppose and follow the accomplishments of the Phenomenology.
In terms of how Hegel composed the book, Rosenkranz identiﬁes the Phenomenology as
the blending of world history, philosophy of history, and philosophical logic. This interpre6

G. W. F. Hegel, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, hrsg, Wolfgang Bonsiepen und Reinhard Heede (Hamburg:
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980). Hereafter this work will be abbreviated as PhänG followed by the page number. See
Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 202-3.
7
Rosenkranz, Hegels Leben, 212.
8
Rosenkranz comments that “The absolutely-absolute form [of spirit] is only achieved, however, with the absoluteness of the content; that is, if the movement, without the possibility of progression, permits only a recollected
return to the series of progressing shapes. This means that the free presentation of the absolute exits in its unity
with self-consciousness. The cognition of this process readily displays, then, not only self-consciousness set by
determinate stages of its self-generation, which constitutes the particular shape of knowledge, but also the various
matters that have been ﬁxed in it and are necessary to consciousness,” Hegels Leben, 203.
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tation is a contested claim in Hegel scholarship. We can see this issue appearing in the Otto
Pöggeler and Hans Fulda debates of the 1960s which, in turn, led to the systematic reading of
the Phenomenology by Dieter Henrich, among others, in the 1970s.9 The systematic reading
tends to discount the importance of the historical motif of Hegel’s method. If Rosenkranz
is correct, however, then one must accept that Hegel’s phenomenological account is a philosophical history. Since Hegel himself says in the book that the Phenomenology is a “detailed
history” of the formation of spirit, there is much merit to the claim.10
We should note that when Rosenkranz departs from the describing the shapes and movements in the Phenomenology he extols the art of thebook. However, while his claim that the
Phenomenology is an “authentic work of art” is no doubt true, this kind of statement is misleading because the implication is that the Phenomenology is foremost a work of literature and
not of scientiﬁc philosophy. Rosenkranz’s intention is to have us believe that Hegel’s work is
both science and art, and thus it is a triumph of his genius as both a philosopher and writer.
Rosenkranz, as a philosopher, played an important role promoting German Idealism and
defending Hegelianism against contemporary critics in the aftermath of Hegel’s death in 1831.
The hallmark of Rosenkranz’s defense of Hegel (against the Left Hegelians, such as, David
Strauss, the diatribes of Schopenhauer, and the proponents of Fichte and Herder)11 was to
advance Hegel’s philosophy as a philosophical science against both the traditional religious
authorities and the left-leaning radicals.12 In general, Rosenkranz sees Hegel as the creator of
systematic philosophy who, although engaged in the intellectual controversies of the day, is
above all else the champion of understanding philosophy as the science of the whole. Hegel’s
revolution, according to Rosenkranz, is intellectual because philosophy must be understood
as a universal science that embraces all branches of knowledge.
9
See, for instance, Hans Fulda, “Zur Logik der Phänomenologie von 1807,” in Hegel in der Sicht der Neueren
Forschung, hrsg., Iring Fetscher (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973), 3-34. Dieter Henrich,
Hegel im Kontext (1971, rpt; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988). Others who support the systematic
reading of the Phenomenology include, Johannes Heinrichs, Die Logik der Phänomenologie des Geistes (Bonn:
Bouvier Verlag, 1974) and Gerd Kimmerle, Sein und Selbst: Untersuchung zur kategorialen Einheit von Vernuft
und Geist in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1978).
10
Hegel says, “The series of shapes, which consciousness acquires on its ‘pathway of despair,’ is, instead, its
detailed history of the formation of consciousness on its way to science,” PhänG, 56. Proponents of the historical
method include Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegels Dialetik (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1971) and more recently, H. S.
Harris, Hegel’s Ladder, vols. 1-2 (Indianapolis: Hackett Publications, 1997).
11
Rosenkranz opposed Arthur Schopenhauer in his On the Characteristic of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy (1854)
and Rudolf Haym (who wrote an inﬂuential criticism of Hegel) in his Apology for Hegel against Dr. Rudolf Haym
(1858).
12
Rosenkranz was a critic of both David Strauss, who was a Left Hegelian, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, who
was the founder of the German Evangelical Church. Cf. Rosenkranz, Critique of Schleiermacher’s Doctrine of
Faith (1836) and Critique of the Principles of the Straussian Doctrine of Faith (1840).
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While advancing Hegel’s cause, Rosenkranz also inserts his own comments on how Hegel’s
compositions could have been improved.13 We see this, as well, in his treatment of the Phenomenology when he contends that the accidental character of world-history could have been
removed from the book, and that contemporary philosophical problems, which Hegel was
interested in solving, became outdated and can now be ignored. He also concedes as a weakness of the book that Fichte’s treatment of cognition had already worked out the fundamental
structure of consciousness, so that much of what Hegel says in the ﬁrst three chapters in the
Phenomenology is not necessary. Whether or not one agrees with Rosenkranz’s appraisals,
it is most likely a fair portrait of Hegel and his philosophy from the standpoint of the Berlin
period. The idea of philosophy as the science of the whole, which Rosenkranz presents as
Hegel’s greatest accomplishment, is certainly consistent with the account of philosophy that
Hegel gives, for instance, in the Prefaces both to the Phenomenology and Encyclopedia.

13

Cf. Rosenkranz’s Critical Elucidation of Hegel’s System (1840) and My Reform of Hegelian Philosophy
(1852). He wrote the Science of the Logical Idea, vols. 1-2 (1858/59) as the clariﬁcation and reformulation of
Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817-30).
Academia Letters, March 2021
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